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Thinking Critically And
Teaching Critical Thinking
by George S. Maecia
At the outset I wish to acknowledge that the argument employed in this paper is
derived from Th e Idea of a Social Science by Peter Winch.l Extensions relate to what
I believe is the significance of the argument for critical thinking and teaching critical
thinking.
I shall set forth the argument and its significance as answers to the following
questions:
1. What does it mean to say that one follows a rule? 2
2. What does it mean to say that one knows a rule?
3 . What is the context for critical thinking?
4. What are some criteria of critical thinking?
5. What might we do in teaching critical thinking?
In answering the first question I shall attempt to show th a t rules are contextual and
obligatory. In answering the second question I shall argue that following a rule as
a matter of course beyond what has been ta ught is to know, to think, and to think
critically. In answering the third question I shall suggest that there are contexts for
critical thinking, and that one rule does not transfer generally to all contexts. In
answering the fourth question I shall attempt to Signify some meta-rules - rules of
a rule or criteria - employed in critical thinking by noting kinds of thinking people
do. Finally, I shall suggest what my argument implies for teaching critical thinking .

What does it mean to say that one follows a rule?
To follow a rule is to apply a given formula in an appropriate context. If we
consider this statement, it is apparent that I assume that a rule is understood and
that certain actions follow from it. Both of these assumptions are inherent in all
statements which manifestly conduce action. With such statements the actor is obligated to act in one way and not in another. In the context of everyday life such
statements are usually presented as a command or moral maxim: "Shut the door! "
" Thou shalt not kill! " It seems clear that commands or maxims or statements of
these rules and the obligation to follow them is readily apparent to persons in this
culture. It may not be equally apparent that all meaningful statements impliCitly contain an obligation to act in a certain way, for not all statements are stated as rules;
yet all statements which are meaningful intend to communicate something to be done.
The terms "meaning" and " communication " suggest that the business of making
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statements is social and what one does he does within a social context. For statements to have meaning and for communication to occur, there must be at least two
persons. The conjunction of the one with the other produces the obligation. Are you
obliged to make sense of what I am saying? Of course, you are. You are at this
meeting. Am I obliged to make sense? Of course, I am. I am here with you. The
context of this meeting requires certain behavior from each of us. Much of your
thinking in the next several minutes will be devoted to the sense of what I am saying. In the period which follows the presentation of my paper much time in our
discussion will be spent to ascertain what sense I have made. You hold that I am
obligated to follow the rule of philosophical discourse. You will be seeking regularities in my discourse. Any irregularities that you find will Signal that I have not
followed a rule and that I have made a mistake. You will hold me responsible for
my mistakes. Some of you may not be very gentle in calling my attention to such
mistakes. Your action and mine point up the obligation. A rule must be followed
correctly.
In this talk of you and me I have indicated that to follow a rule is to engage
in ordered action which is error free. To follow a rule is not to make mistakes. It
would make no sense to talk of mistakes unless there were two of us. If I were by
myself, what sense would it make to talk of mistakes? Clearly a rule requires a
context, and the basis for that context is you and I. In elaborating the argument
that it takes two - at least in principle - to have a rule, I have borrowed from
Wittgenstein.
Imagine someone using a line as a rule in the follOWing way: he
holds a pair of compasses, and carries one of its points along the line
that is the " rule" ... And while he moves along the ruling line he alters
the opening of the compasses, apparently with great precision, looking
at the rule the whole time as if it determined what he did. And watching
him we see no kind of regularity in this opening and shutting of the
compasses. We cannot learn his way of follOWing the line from it. Here
perhaps one really would say: "The original seems to intimate to him
which way he is to go. But it is not a rule." 3
Before moving further with the example, I wish you to note that the decision of the
observer assumes a context. The terms "compasses" and "line" help denote that
context and also suggest the purposes for opening and shutting the compasses. Note
also, please, the entire description makes sense only if both the draftsman and observer are in the same context. In this example the observer is correct to expect the
draftsman to follow a rule, for he is moving within a context as if he understood it.
To use the now very trite analogy of the game, the draftsman behaved as if he knew
the game he was playing.
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The term we might employ in designating the behavior of the draftsman is
"haphazard." In the context of our language haphazard behavior is not regular.
It is not rule governed, for logically regularity is separable from haphazardness.
If, however, we suppose the draftsman is following a rule, irregular behavior would
indicate that he is mistaken. To say that one is following a rule, therefore, is to say
that the behavior has been evaluated. Even when only one behaves - if there is a
rule being followed-in principle there is another to grasp the rule. It makes no sense
to suppose that an individual can establish a personal rule of action, if he never had
contact with other persons with socially established rules. It really does take two to
Tango. My statements here may seem so outrageous to some of you that I shall
take the time to cite two 4 of many instances which illustrate the degree to which
being human rests upon a social context.
A girl named Anna lived for six years virtually without contact with other
humans. She was kept in an attic room with only enough care to keep her alive.
Evidence suggested that she was seldom moved from one position to another and
had received no instruction. When Anna was discovered she could not walk, talk,
or do anything that indicated intelligence. Anna was placed in an institution for
retarded children. Four years later, just before she died, the institution reported that
Anna could follow directions. She could string beads, identify some colors, distingUish between attractive and unattractive pictures, and talk in phrases. Furthermore
she regularly washed her hands and brushed her teeth and tried to help other children. She walked well and could run.
Isabelle, a girl born one month later than Anna, was subject to almost the
same isolation as Anna. She too was discovered when she was six years old. Those
who found her said, "She was apparently utterly unaware of relationships of any
kind." They thought that Isabelle was "wholly uneducable and that any attempt to
teach her to speak, after so long a period of silence, would meet with failure." Isabelle's Stanford-Binet I.Q. score was that of one 19 months old. Through a carefully deSigned program centered in pantomime and dramatization, Isabelle's I.Q
Score trebled in one and one half years, and was that of an average child of six.
These cases, not only point up that rules are social, they also indicate that
grasping a rule and follOWing it is symbolic activity. Regularities (rules) of movements of matter and in the behavior of non-humans or of humans can be grasped
only by humans. It is the human who formulates the regularity as a rule and exemplifies it in behavior. Thus, it can be said that only persons know a rule.

What does it mean to say that one knows a rule?
The term "knowing" includes its negation, "not-knowing." Behavior according
to rules not known I call "conditioned." I shall explain what it means to know a
rule by beginning with an example of conditioning. Let us consider the case of a
dog which has been conditioned to bark a series - on cue it barks once, then twice,
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and three times. The dog barks on cue very much the way in which a child might
continue a series of numbers on cue; but the dog barks according to a rule and
does not know the rule, for it cannot continue the series as a matter of course beyond what it had been taught. The terminus of three is set in its conditioning. Not
even in principle can the dog follow a rule. It does not have the symbolic context
from which rules obtain their meaning. A child who follows a rule beyond what
he has been taught knows the rule, even though he cannot formulate the rule. To
know a rule does not require necessarily the formulation of the rule, but knowing
a rule does require going the way the rule is to go. The behavior which follows the
rule when the rule is known follows that rule as a matter of course. Such knowing
does not make mistakes, but going the right way cannot occur unless judgment is
involved in knOWing the rule. Mistakes must be avoided or corrected in fulfilling
the obligation to follow a rule. In following a rule knOWing is thinking, and thinking is critical since judgment is involved. Since there are rules only in a context,
the context for rules is the context for critical thinking.

What is the context for critical thinking?
Judging from what I have said thus far, the context for critical thinking is the
symbols and the connections between symbols which conduce to one action rather
than another. Yet it is not the symbols and connections alone that prOVide the substance of contexts. The connections between symbols are related to intentions that
something be done. It is true that the motions of matter are ascribed to a discipline
called physics, but there would be no context for physics unless there were the intention to explain the motions of matter in relation to measured observables. It would
not be sufficient that a person formulate a rule of motion. The purpose to explain
the motions of matter in relation to measured observables requires a distinction between a right and a wrong way for formulating such rules. Such a distinction permits us to sort out the physicist from the quack.
Contexts are social. Although contexts are SOCial, there is a context only when
one and another agree in purpose. Again the analogy of the game! There is a game
only when all the players play it. There is, therefore, a context for critical thinking
only when some public connects symbols so that something is to be done. That which
is to be done is a rule of rules in the context. It is the imperative for folloWing a
rule. It is a criterion employed in folloWing the rule.
Since the same symbols may have different connections, the contexts are many.
Since contexts are formed through the intentions of persons and the intentions of
persons are many, there is no one rule for all contexts. If there is no one rule for
all contexts, there is no rule which transfers generally to any context and there is
more than one way to think critically. Transfer of rules can occur only in the regions
in which contexts are the same. Our experience tells us that there are such regions,
because contexts are changed through other contexts in which the rule imperatives
are the same.
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What are some criteria of critical thinking?
The obligation to follow a rule without making mistakes points up the critical
side of thinking, for in order to follow a rule correctly one must judge or evaluate
what one is dOing. Also to follow a rule correctly there must be a context in which
the rule is appropriate. Consequently, critical thinking is related to the rule and the
context. Since a rule is no rule without a context and a context is no context witllOut
a purpose, thinking critically stated simply as following a rule is no simple task.
Due to the plurality of social relations, very few of a man's purposes are universally
agreed upon . Very few contexts are defined unambiguously.
Examples may serve to illustrate different ways in which critical thinking focuses
on the rule and on the context. Suppose a student in mathematics is confronted by a
con text in which the rule of interpolation is appropriate. For the student the context
and the rule are given. His critical thinking centers on ascertaining whether he is mistaken. On the other hand, suppose a mathematician is extending the rule of mathematics. His context is squared circles and he seeks to formulate the rule of squaring
circles. In applying criteria of proof he finds no rule may be formulated and rejects
the context of squared circles. For the mathematician his broader context is mathematics, and the rule he follows has him center his critical thinking on the small context with which he began. The example of the mathematician shows how following a
rule eliminates ambiguity in a context.
I shall illustrate now that critical thinking focuses also upon the intention which
forms a context. Suppose two persons are playing tennis and one player can always
ace the other. If both are to continue to play, the purpose of the game must be altered.
If they agree on the purpose that both hit the ball, the context of tlle game is no
longer tennis and there is no purpose to defeat one's opponent. The rule is to hit
the ball so that the other can hit it back.
The examples and illustration surely have pointed out the difficulty of stating
criteria. However, Winch further emphasizes the difficulty; hence, I shall quote him.
Putting the point generally, even if it is legitimate to speak of one's
understanding of a mode of social activity as consisting in a knowledge
of regularities, the nature of this knowledge must be very different from
the nature of knowledge of physical regularities. So it is quite mistaken
in principle to compare the activity of a student of a form of social behavior with that of, say, an engineer studying the workings of a machine; and one does not advance matters by saying with Mill, that the
machine in question is of course immensely more complicated than any
physical machine. If we are going to compare tlle social student to an
engineer, we shall do better to compare him to an apprentice engineer
who is studying what engineering - that is, the activity of engineering is all about. His understanding of social phenomena is more like the
engineer's understanding of his colleagues' activities than it is like the
engineer's understanding of the mechanical systems which he studies. 5
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Since one might be able to think critically without being able to formulate criteria, as my analysis has indicated, why bother to attempt to state criteria? This
question deserves an answer. My analysis does admit of systemic as well as systematic critical thinking. In systemic or non-discursive critical thinking one judges
and so follows the rule correctly, but one does not in his thinking proceed in a stepwise manner. There is no deliberate and self-conscious use of a criterion or criteria.
Systematic thinking, on the other hand, is discursive. It involves the use of formulated criteria. Other things being equal, however, systemic thinking cannot be taught
as directly and in as short a time as systematic thinking. The teaching of systemic
critical thinking probably would require a longer exposure to situations requiring
judgment which are being handled by expert judges, such as much of the teaching
in art. Consequently, there is an attempt to state criteria, so that systematic critical
thinking can be taught.
Criteria of critical thinking have been formulated as rules of logiC. These rules
have been characterized traditionally as falling within deductive and inductive logiC.
Charles S. Peirce has suggested that traditional formulations of the rules of induction are mistaken, and that the rules relate to determination whether an instance is
a member of a class of instances. The rules of sampling as employed in probability
theory proVide examples of Peirce's reformulation of the realm of inductive logiC.
Peirce also revived Aristotle's abduction, which he called " retroduction." For Peirce
retroduction is thinking which employs rules from one context as analogs for formulating rules in another context. Recently E. S. Maccia has begun an explication of
retroduction as the use of one context as a non-representational model for devising
another context. 6 I shall not dwell on these logical realms in which criteria are to
be found, but turn to marking off other logical realms to explore for criteria of critical thinking.
When a person seeks to establish a trend, he uses some variant of a criterion
of continuity. In determining a trend he ascertains some rule of succession between
each event, and he follows that rule until some intended terminus is reached. In a
number context the rule of succession is one form of progression. In a context of lines
and numbers the rule is extrapolation. In an historical context not only is some rule
of succession used, but also some rule of Significance. Since the context for history
is not as well understood as the context for mathematics, the meaning of significance
in history is more varied than any criterion of Significance for mathematics. Ambiguity of a criterion of Significance occurs both in the diSCiplines called "social scieIlCes" and in ordinary social formulations. These ambigUities can be removed only
through clarification of the context. Since such a realm of logiC has not been noted
generally, I suggest the term " tendention" be used to signify it.
Another realm of logiC to which I would like to call your attention, I shall
term "referention." Referention is used when a person seeks to locate place or position of some instance or some event. In determining the place, a person takes the
beginning and end terms of the context as given and fixed. In locating the place he
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uses some criterion of continuity as he follows a rule of referral. Contexts for referention are illustrated by a card file, the process of interpolation in mathematics, chronology in history, the status of an individual or a group, and map reading.
The final realm of logiC which I shall consider in this paper, I call" influention."
Influention is used when one wishes to convince another that some action is desirable.
Some rules for influention have been formulated. They number among the well known
logical mistakes called "fallacies." The rejection of the use of fallacies in deductive
logiC rests on the intention in deduction to obtain valid conclusions. In influention
the intention is entirely different. The purpose is to persuade one to act. Validity in
its usual sense is not a criterion. The criterion used in influention relates to persuasion. Selling, politics, and propaganda are contexts in which influention is used.
In suggesting influention as a way of critical thinking, I have insisted in perhaps a shocking manner that the criteria of rightness have been restricted unduly.
Logic has been unduly narrowed. How far logiC should be broadened I take to be
systemic.

What might we do in teaching critical thinking?
If thinking is rule governed behavior, if man is obliged to follow rules, all
thinking is critical. Since rules are rules only in a context and to be in a context
is to agree in purpose, the teacher of critical thinking must help students to grasp
the context in which the rule is appropriate. The content as well as the process must
be learned. No Single formulation of rules for thinking is applicable to any context.
There are not five basic rules or six or seven or any particular number in critical
thinking. We are mistaken when we teach one set of rules applicable in one context
as if it were applicable to all contexts. In so far as the human is concerned, contexts
are there. They have been given in his social relations as he has developed as a
social being. There cannot be an entirely new context, for the game is already formulated. The time developed practice of teaching as subjects those contexts which are
understood and haVing students learn to follow appropriate rules must continue,
but the past and present neglect of contexts for which rules are appropriate need
not continue. The mistake to which I am referring is exemplified in teaching for daily
living. In teaching arithmetic, for example, the algorisms are taught as slices of pie
or some such thing. The mistake is one of context. SliCing pie and putting together
slices of pie is not the same as dividing and adding. Dividing and adding are done
entirely with different symbols and different behaviors. When dividing and adding
are transferred to pie cutting and pie summing, the rule is not the same. That the
rules of mathematics are not the same as other linguistic rules becomes evident in
what is done in solVing problems stated in words . In solVing word problems rules
of translation from word symbols to mathematical symbols are followed. Only after
such translation is the problem solved, and it is always solved in mathematics. Please
note that translations of words to numbers and operational symbols in mathematics
is quite different from sliCing pies and mixing nuts, but in the usual teaching of mathe-
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matics for life any sorting is left to systemic thinking by the student. Is it any wonder
then that many students become hopelessly confused in arithmetic and understand
mathematics as getting the right answer?
If the student learns to follow rules, he does so only when they are appropriate
to a context. Nor does it follow from what I said that we should not teach rules of
application. It does follow that rules of transfer must be grasped and that they can
be followed only as rules of transfer and not as rules of the discipline from which
they are transferred. Our failure to teach for transfer seems to result from the mistake of treating different contexts as the same. If we are going to be able systematically to teach for transfer, we shall have to grasp these rules and formulate them
so that they can be taught.
I am not advocating a return to any "traditional" rote learning - if there
ever was such a practice in teaching - but advocating that something like the philosophy of be included in teaching the disciplines. And the philosophy of should be
extended beyond that of science and mathematics. Rules are to be found in logical
realms other than deduction and induction. Is there merit in tendention, referention,
and influention?

FOOTNOTES
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